the cooperation with the Verkehrswacht mainly because the organisation had numerous teachers in its ranks who delivered talks in schools. The Verkehrswacht was keen to present traffic education as a way of creating a modern 'traffic accustomed' generation. 13 Berlin police officer Seyffahrt explained how this active participation should work: 'The police need everyone, every pedestrian, cyclist, car driver and especially every pupil when the traffic should be regulated to prevent accidents. If successful, Germany would not need to be a country of police because everyone would be his own policeman.' 14 Here the police suggested responsible behaviour of every citizen for his/her actions rather than appointing some who should monitor the behaviour of others. Occasionally, the police became irritated when the Verkehrswacht wanted police powers, e.g. powers to arrest or to fine, for its members. Local police from a number of cities stated that Verkehrswacht members had no more powers within traffic policing than anyone else. 15 Hermann Paetsch, Regierungrsat in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, cautioned that the police should make sure it kept the core expertise and authority on areas as accident prevention and traffic education. 16 Initially, the National Socialist take-over of power changed little in relation to traffic safety education and traffic policing. But National Socialist rhetoric turned the traffic community of the 1920s into a symbol of their Volksgemeinschaft calling those causing accidents selfish and egocentric. 17 Similarly to the Weimar years, the success of traffic safety weeks did not become evident through falling accidents. Therefore, stricter police actions were announced. 18 It was the nation-wide traffic safety week in late June 1938 that spelled an 13 There are no substantial studies on the Verkehrswacht's activities in the 1920s and 1930s but the ideas of the organisation can be found in its publications. See, for example, BArch Berlin, R5/840, Mitteilungen der Deutschen Verkehrswacht e.V., no. end to educational efforts and publicly announced harsher fines. Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels stated that this event was the last one in which traffic rules were still explained, any wrongdoings afterwards would be severely punished. 19 From 1938 onwards, police could punish traffic violations without having to involve the legal system. This could mean confiscating driver's licences as well as publicly naming (and shaming) those involved in traffic violations. 20 Policemen, local authorities, teachers and private associations had experienced throughout the Weimar and the Nazi years that the public differentiated between knowing and following traffic regulations. Furthermore, the National Socialists came to realise that their alleged traffic community was shaky. In March 1936, the journal Kampf der Gefahr asked the public to point out local danger spots on the roads that could be easily abolished. Under the heading 'The street belongs to everyone', every 'national comrade' should participate in this little contest to prevent accidents. 21 After having looked at the suggestions, the police realised that most were complaints rather than constructive proposals. 22 Citizens did use the opportunity to make their voices heard but not in the way the organisers had hoped for. The beginning of the Second World War substantially reduced civilian traffic and, consequently, scaled down traffic education.
Engaging the Public: The Difficulties of Participation
Scholarship on the post-war years in West Germany has shifted from interpreting this time A year later, Munich had a similar committee. These activities tried to involve the individual citizen and, at the same time, suggested that the police reacted to problems together with the public. 34 The film Citizens in Uniform from 1951 presented the official message of West Germany's police by portraying one day of a policeman filled with helpful tasks and the film concluded: 'And now we know that policemen are citizens just like us, citizens in uniform.'
The audience should not make the job of the police even more difficult by traffic violations.
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While both films continued police efforts to re-gain public trust, they also asked for active participation.
Not everyone appreciated these initiatives and some felt that the line to denouncing Die Polizei investigated these claims. According to Hamburg's police, its 'community of traffic friends' consisted of 300 experienced drivers who had been selected based on their excellent driving record. They had no police powers but were asked to remind people about correct behaviour, to report wrongdoings and to inform the police of exemplary behaviour too. without creating an atmosphere of denunciations illustrates the difficulties of using 'orderly behaviour' as key concept of re-constructing societies. Equally difficult was to rely on semiprivate associations as watchdogs.
Public Performance of Orderly Behaviour: Traffic Education Weeks
Another way of engaging the population was the staging of traffic education weeks which publicly put the behaviour of individuals under the spotlight. Often these events were organised locally and one of the first after the end of the war was carried in Leipzig in 49 Germany's police were considered by many in the early post-war years as not getting involved in areas that mattered to the public, while they policed activities seen as unnecessary. 58 This suggestion echoed public sentiments in West Germany and can probably partly explain the behaviour encountered by the police.
West Germany lagged behind in regards to big and centrally organised traffic education weeks with the first nation-wide one in 1950. In Düsseldorf, the envisioned event in 1947 was cancelled due to a lack of resources. 59 Despite these early setbacks, Düsseldorf often served as testing ground for traffic safety initiatives before they were rolled out throughout North-Rhine
Westphalia (NRW). Wilhelm Vonolfen, a former teacher and the Ministry of Culture and
Education's representative on NRW's traffic committee, pointed out that traffic safety had not been dealt with for 14 years and, therefore, teachers needed to be trained again in this area. 60 He neglected his own activities. There was, by no means, a lack of activities when the Nazis came to power and he had been an active contributor to the Verkehrswacht's journal in the Weimar and the Nazi period. 61 In September 1947, the NRW Ministry of the Interior advised local police stations to pay particular attention to traffic education as the first six months of the year had already seen 612 fatal casualties due to traffic accidents. 62 A list of causes for traffic accidents placed inattentiveness, recklessness and inconsideration as top three followed by poor conditions of vehicles, 'the current food situation and the general exhaustion of the public leading to slower reaction time' and the long interruption of efficient traffic education. The Ministry of the Interior put the blame for accidents largely on the behaviour of public which, consequently, needed more education. This education was not solely the responsibility of the police but involved teachers, parents and everyone else stressing that traffic accidents happened regardless of class, age or gender. 63 Once again we find efforts to reach beyond the directly concerned local authorities and to present traffic safety as a communal task of an educated and engaged public. At the same time, not everyone of this public seemed to be equally suitable to participate. With phrases similar to East Germany, the urban public was described as 'numb and indifferent' concluding with the extraordinary remark that parents who were not teaching their children on traffic dangers were to be blamed in case the children suffered fatal accidents. 64 Unlike other areas in the immediate post-war year in which 'a crisis of the youth'
was proclaimed due to the alleged Verwilderung and lawlessness of young people, 65 traffic safety debates suggested that the behaviour of adults was considered as equally inadequate.
Commenting directly on the police, the report from 1947 described the traffic safety of any given area as 'a mirror of police discipline, education and police achievements.'
Furthermore, policemen were reminded that helping the elderly as well as children demonstrated that the police were truly connected to the people: '…and whoever believes that these actions are below his dignity or not masculine enough has not understood the deeper meaning of his profession and cannot be a policeman in a democratic state.' 66 This is a surprising comment because North-Rhine Westphalia's police did not depend on women involved in traffic policing and the image presented here of the policeman as friend and helper for the vulnerable sections of society had a long tradition. For some, more pastoral police tasks seemed to counteract a strong masculine idea of law and order enforcement. Generally 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Jaimey Fisher argues that the focus on the youth was to divert attention from adults and to suggest that it was only the young who were in need of re-education. J. speaking, the discourses, policy making and law enforcements regarding traffic education and traffic policing in West Germany were dominated by men in the late 1940s and 1950s.
Policing and law enforcement was carried out by male police officers and also the leading figures of local Verkehrswachten were men and so were civilian officials in the responsible ministries. That the framework of the allegedly inclusive 'traffic community' was determined by men might not come as a surprise given the nature of the organisations involved. However, East Germany relied heavily on police women in traffic policing and traffic education-partly based on a lack of manpower but also because women were believed to establish a better rapport with the public and especially with children.
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When the first nationally organised traffic education week happed in West Germany in 1950, this type of public event was already under scrutiny as possibly not delivering the envisioned results and as being too costly. The arguments were similar to the ones made in East Germany, but despite concerns in both German states, traffic education weeks remained a long-lasting annual (sometimes bi-annual) feature of traffic education. While the federal minister of traffic supported the safety weeks, the Verkehrswacht stressed that these events could only contribute to continuous traffic education carried out by their local organisations.
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Even though the early 1950s did not see the same level of indifference that police forces found in the late 1940s, the 'success rate' of these activities were not convincing for everyone.
Some in the Verkehrswacht found that public space could not be used equally well everywhere and that big traffic safety events would have a better impact in small and medium-size towns. Citizens of big cities, so the argument, were used to big and sensational events that they did not care anymore about traffic safety weeks. 69 To reinforce its importance as local guardian of traffic education, the Verkehrswacht stressed the small-scale daily work that needed to be invested into this area. Verkehrswacht described the importance of big traffic education campaigns mainly due to the indifferent and apathetic behaviour of those who could only be reached by big-scale events.
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The patronising and authoritarian tone of the organisation seemed to have now been complemented by slight dislike for those the Verkehrswacht was meant to reach. When traffic safety weeks were envisioned as activities that could publicly demonstrate the good relations between police and public as well as impose pressure on individual behaviour, the reality was often far behind these expectations. The call for stricter regulations and punishment seemed logical for those involved in traffic education who felt frustrated by the public's seemingly reluctance to cooperate and to take their duties as citizens in the new democratic society seriously.
The moderate suggestion of Fritz Stiebitz, teaching at the police school in Hiltrup, who felt that the concept of 'traffic education' was problematic because adults did not want to be publicly 'educated' or even told off and that possibly 'traffic advice' could be its replacement, did not reach a wide audience. 71 Already ten years earlier, Fritz Henkel had hoped that East Germany's 'traffic education weeks' could soon be renamed to 'accidents prevention weeks'
as the education of the public would not be needed anymore. 72 Both men had a valid point with their suggestion of re-considering, among other aspects, the language used for these events. Traffic safety activities were in East and West Germany compounded in 'traffic education weeks' that allowed adults little more engagement and participation than publicly demonstrating orderly behaviour under the watchful eyes of the police. This might not only have rekindled memories of a very different time period in which participation in publicly staged events was expected but also might have reminded many of the negative connotations should be considered as Nazi practice and was, therefore, not to be carried out. 78 Also the journal Die Polizei warned that the police were not getting involved in these activities due to its similarities with the Nazi era.
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While publicly naming and shaming people in the press reminded some of methods used in Nazi Germany, so did traffic controls carried out by plain-clothes police officers. In
February 1952, North-Rhine Westphalia's minister of the Interior found that the use of plainclothes officers was an appropriate way to act against the lack of discipline on the roads and recommended these actions to local police forces. 80 By and large, the district presidents from
North-Rhine Westphalia reported back positive experiences from their police forces. 81 All reports stressed, however, that the press did not react positively to these measures.
Furthermore, the president of the Munich branch of the ADAC could hardly hide his anger regarding the actions of the police in North-Rhine Westphalia and wrote to the interior minister that controls carried out by plain-clothes police officers were incompatible with the constitution and Germany's democratic state. He demanded that these clandestine 'Gestapo methods' needed to stop as they undermined the trust in the Rechtsstaat, negated the image of the police as 'friend and helper' and reminded of the police state Germany once was.
Furthermore, the ADAC's president claimed that numerous angry letters from the public had made these points.
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While the ADAC's effort to intervene did not create a change of policy, two years later, in 1954 also the press loudly criticised controls by plain-clothes policemen. In December 1952 West Germany had, also due to the lobbying of automobile associations, abolished the speed limit. The impact on traffic accidents was disastrous and in 1957 the speed limit was re- circumstances, a strong re-education is needed and it is a necessity to re-educate adults to traffic safety.' 93 The report praised police efforts in the area of school education but found that school authorities needed to support these efforts in greater extent. Not surprisingly, the report commended the work of the Verkehrswacht considering its local organisations as a great way of supporting democratic ideas through public's participation. 94 By late 1952, German authorities already knew how difficult traffic education of adults actually was and had some experience with the sometimes overzealous Verkehrswacht members.
GDR efforts to engage and educate the public in traffic safety measures were partly similar to those in the FRG as we have already seen in traffic education weeks. However, the opportunity to rely on state organisations as e.g. the country's youth organisations, the centrally organised support for the police (the ABV or police volunteers) and associations that ensured security and safety in factory plants allowed for a more centralised approach-even though this did not necessarily mean more success. Similarly to the FRG, not all efforts to engage a wider section of the population were seen as legitimate. Experiments in Dresden and
Chemnitz in the late 1950s involved the Verkehrsaktive, voluntary associations that monitored traffic safety in industrial and agricultural work premises, to check on the behaviour of the general public in the centre of both cities. The initiatives were eventually stopped due to interventions of the main office of police in Berlin pointing out that police powers (as stopping cars or even arresting drivers) could not be given to any other organisation but the police. Suggestions to uniform or equip volunteers with traffic policing equipment were considered as unacceptable and any efforts in this direction were abandoned. 95 While traffic education of adults seemed to stagnate, it was work with children and pupils that triggered innovative initiatives. In line with suggestions already formulated in the 1920s and 1930s, the focus shifted to young people and school activities. Educational and school reforms were key areas of re-education in post-1945 German society and have been focus upon in detail by historical studies. 96 Traffic safety education in schools has not been discussed in these works as they often focus on more explicitly pronounced educational reforms. But as we have already seen with adults, traffic education targeted at youngsters combined correct behaviour on the roads with good citizenship contributing to participating in civil society. Despite lobbying from numerous circles, traffic safety education never became an independent subject established as part of the school's curriculum neither in East nor West
Germany. However, it was carried out as an 'extra' activity at certain points during the school year and within a school context including a number of different agents; namely policemen, teachers, and members of the Verkehrswacht. In the city of Münster, the police communicated traffic violations from pupils directly to the schools. Schools contacted the parents and the teachers and used the individual cases to talk about the dangers on the roads. 97 Practical exercises were carried out as well and in these police officers were particularly involved.
These could include showing children how to safely cross a busy street as well as testing pupils' abilities to safely ride a bicycle. 98 In fact, successful passing of the 'bicycle test' was believed 'to strengthen the responsibility for the traffic community of the future trafficgeneration.' 99 Even more focus on individual responsibility for the traffic community was placed on training pupils to become safety patrols and to help their younger schoolmates to get to school safely and, especially, to cross busy streets. Tried out on local level already in 1948, NorthRhine Westphalia introduced a trial run for safety patrols carried out by pupils over 13 years in Düsseldorf, Münster and Cologne in 1952. The education of the safety patrols was carried out by the police. Parents were reassured that their children did not act as 'teenage traffic police.' 100 The federal minister for traffic recommended this idea to be implemented in all Pedestrians, cyclists and car drivers need to take care of each other and have to get used to the order imposed upon them.' 106 His lament was mainly directed at adults as the 1950s saw some new developments in reaching out to children and younger people.
The strongly suggested link between so-called 'traffic discipline' and civil responsibility/good citizenship only partly convinced the general public. The increasingly authoritarian efforts to hammer home the message of traffic safety campaigns were debated and often criticised with references to the Nazi period. Certainly, the accusations of 'police terror', denunciations or the fear of a new uniformed youth were also convenient for those who wanted to discredit the efforts and actions carried out by police forces and other state and local officials. Both sides based their arguments on civil responsibility, community and citizenship. Efforts to fight the 'traffic problem' were an uneasy mixture of calling for more self-discipline, good relations with the police and traffic decency as well as threatening with draconian penalties and plain-clothes police officers. While ideally traffic experts hoped that citizens learned from each other and behaved as one big traffic community rather than having to impose state authority through police forces, the reality was rather different. State official struggled with their own conceptual link between behaviour on the roads and behaviour as good/decent citizen-a concept also heavily relying on authoritarian ideas of the state. Efforts to include practices of denunciation within a clear democratic framework were illustrated by the limits of the Rechtsstaat pointed out to those who eagerly wanted to report their fellow citizens. The combination of civil responsibility, democratic citizenship and law abiding behaviour was not easily achieved especially when citizens articulated that too much state regulations were actually seen as reminding of anything but a new democratic society.
The conclusion that 'good citizens' actually still behaved badly when it came to observing traffic regulations did not fit the moral and civil framework into which traffic policing and traffic safety education had been placed from its very beginning. The idea that the rights and liberties of a citizen could also mean making wrong decisions and then having to deal with the consequences of this behaviour (legal ones or otherwise) featured little in the 1940s and 1950s debates about traffic safety. The Eigensinn of the public choosing to ignore traffic rules, despite better knowledge, was impossible to reconcile with the authoritarian and patronising pedagogical approach so obvious in traffic safety debates of the 1940s and 1950s.
At the same time, citizens also negotiated their participation in this process by using a variety of options available to them on an individual basis. Some actively participated through local traffic safety organisations or by reporting wrongdoings, others complained about state interference, over-policing and being publicly told how to behave. Even though officials and policemen would have preferred the public to behave differently, West Germans contributed in their own and personal ways to the re-negotiation of post-war attitudes on citizenship, state interference, individual responsibility and civil society.
